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The foreclosure argument for exclusive dealing: The case of differentiated retailers

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  • Tommy Gabrielsen

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  • Tommy Gabrielsen, 1996. "The foreclosure argument for exclusive dealing: The case of differentiated retailers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 25-40, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:63:y:1996:i:1:p:25-40
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01237244
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shaffer, G., 1991. "Capturing Strategic Rent : Full-Line Forcing, Maximum Resale Price Maintenance, Brand Discount and Aggregate Rebates," Papers 91-08, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    2. Shaffer, Greg, 1991. "Capturing Strategic Rent: Full-Line Forcing, Brand Discounts, Aggregate Rebates, and Maximum Resale Price Maintenance," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 557-575, September.
    3. Mathewson, G Frank & Winter, Ralph A, 1987. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1057-1062, December.
    4. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen & Lars Sørgard, 1999. "Exclusive versus Common Dealership," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(2), pages 353-366, October.
    2. Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl, 2005. "Slotting Allowances and Buy-Back Clauses," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24580, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    3. Li, Shengyu & Luo, Rong, 2020. "Non-Exclusive Dealing with Retailer Differentiation and Market Penetration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    4. José J. Sempere Monerris & Rafael Moner Colonques & Amparo Urbano, 2001. "Equilibrium Distribution Systems Under Retailers' Strategic Behavior," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-01, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    exclusive dealing; foreclosure; L12; L42;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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