Social norms and the indirect evolution of conditional cooperation
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 102 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909
Conditional cooperation; Indirect evolution; Social norms; Heterogenous environments; C70; Z13;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
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