The effects of gallery and artist reputation on prices in the primary market for art: a note
AbstractThis paper advances a decision theoretical foundation for pricing scripts in the primary art market. We argue that while sociological factors play an important role, pricing scripts may well have economic determinants. We use a simple model of product differentiation implementing the undercut proof equilibrium concept to analyse the effects of the gallery’s and the artist’s reputation on the price the gallery charges. The results suggest that prices positively correlate with an artist’s reputation and negatively correlate with a gallery’s reputation. The model may therefore explain similar findings of recent empirical studies on pricing in the primary market for fine art. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Cultural Economics.
Volume (Year): 31 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100284
Pricing scripts; Art galleries; Visual arts; Undercut proof equilibrium; Z11; L11;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
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- Cellini, Roberto & Cuccia, Tiziana, 2014. "The artist–art dealer relationship as a marketing channel," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 57-69.
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