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Is More Targeting Consistent with Less Spending?

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Author Info
Martin Ravallion

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Abstract

Economists often advise governments to target their spending better when cuts are called for. This paper asks whether that advice is consistent with a political-economy constraint that limits the welfare losses to the non-poor from spending cuts. A simple theoretical model shows that the answer is unclear on a priori grounds, and so will depend on the specifics of program design and financing. A case study for a World Bank-supported social program in Argentina illustrates how cuts can come with worse targeting performance; the allocation to the poor falls faster than that to the non-poor. Some lessons are drawn for how the poor might be better protected from cuts. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1008763803499
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 6 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 411-419
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:6:y:1999:i:3:p:411-419

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915

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Related research
Keywords: targeting; poverty; political-economy; Argentina;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lanjouw, Peter & Ravallion, Martin, 1998. "Benefit incidence and the timing of program capture," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1956, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ravallion, 1999. "Monitoring targeting performance when decentralized allocation to the poor are unobserved," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2080, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ravallion, Martin, 1999. "Are poorer states worse at targeting their poor?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 373-377, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ravallion, Martin, 2000. "Monitoring Targeting Performance When Decentralized Allocations to the Poor Are Unobserved," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 331-45, May. [Downloadable!]
  5. De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 1998. " The Political Economy of Targeting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 177-200, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Elbers, Chris & Lanjouw, Peter & Mistiaen, Johan & Özler, Berk & Simler, Kenneth, 2003. "Are neighbors equal?," FCND discussion papers 147, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Elbers, Chris & Lanjouw, Peter & Mistiaen, Johan & Özler, Berk & Simler, Kenneth, 2003. "Are neighbors equal?," FCND briefs 147, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). [Downloadable!]
  2. Ana Corbacho & Mercedes Garcia-Escribano & Gabriela Inchauste, 2003. "Argentina: Macroeconomic Crisis and Household Vulnerability," IMF Working Papers 03/89, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ismael Sanz & Francisco Velazquez, 2003. "What do OECD countries cut first at a time of fiscal adjustments? A dynamic panel data approach," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 19-03, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ravallion, Martin, 2000. "Are the poor protected from budget cuts? theory and evidence for Argentina," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2391, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Martin Ravallion, 2002. "Are the Poor Protected from Budget Cuts? Evidence for Argentina," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 95-121, May. [Downloadable!]
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