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Federalism, weak institutions and the competition for foreign direct investment

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Author Info
Sebastian Kessing ()
Kai Konrad
Christos Kotsogiannis

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10797-007-9058-4
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 16 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 105-123
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Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:16:y:2009:i:1:p:105-123

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Related research
Keywords: Foreign direct investment; Hold-up problem; Federalism; Vertical tax competition; Bidding for firms; Tax base cooccupation; F34; F42; H11; H71; H77;

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Schnitzer, Monika, 1999. "Expropriation and control rights: A dynamic model of foreign direct investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(8), pages 1113-1137, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2007. "Tax Competition between Unitary and Federal Countries," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 17-36, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Berkowitz, Daniel & Li, Wei, 2000. "Tax rights in transition economies: a tragedy of the commons?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 369-397, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Eckhard Janeba, 2000. "Tax Competition When Governments Lack Commitment: Excess Capacity as a Countervailing Threat," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1508-1519, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Timothy Besley & Paul Seabright, 1999. "The effects and policy implications of state aids to industry: an economic analysis," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 14(28), pages 13-53, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Matthias Wrede, 2000. "Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 163-175, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Boadway, R & Keen, M, 1996. "Efficiency and the optimal direction of federal-state transfers," IFS Working Papers W96/01, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    Other versions:
  8. Svejnar, Jan & Smith, Stephen C, 1984. "The Economics of Joint Ventures in Less Developed Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(1), pages 149-67, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1539-1555, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March. [Downloadable!]
  11. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1984. "A Theory of Expropriation and Deviations From Perfect Capital Mobility," NBER Working Papers 0972, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Kehoe, Patrick J, 1989. "Policy Cooperation among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(2), pages 289-96, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Chris Doyle & Sweder Wijnbergen, 1994. "Taxation of foreign multinationals: A sequential bargaining approach to tax holidays," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 211-225, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Axel Dreher, 2006. "Power to the People? The Impact of Decentralization on Governance," KOF Working papers 06-121, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2008. "Competition for FDI with vintage investment and agglomeration advantages," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1210, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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