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The Determinants of Tying Litigation, 1961–2001

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Author Info
Carson Bays ()
Abstract

The idea that changes in Supreme Court decision rules should have measurable effects on the volume of cases litigated has a compelling plausibility, and several models of litigation predict this result. The prediction is a fragile one, however, because it implies very restrictive assumptions about the probability distributions of the cases subject to dispute. The period studied includes four Supreme Court decisions widely regarded as changing the rules and altering the level of uncertainty surrounding the legality of the anti-tying provisions of the antitrust laws. Broad trends in antitrust activity generally and changes in firm profitability statistically explain over three-quarters of the observed variation in tying litigation. Changes in legal precedent have only modest effects upon litigation. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2007

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11294-006-9063-x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Advances in Economic Research.

Volume (Year): 13 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 81-96
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:13:y:2007:i:1:p:81-96

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=112112

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Related research
Keywords: common law efficiency; empirical antitrust; tying litigation; K21; L42;

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    Other versions:
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