The Determinants of Tying Litigation, 1961–2001
AbstractThe idea that changes in Supreme Court decision rules should have measurable effects on the volume of cases litigated has a compelling plausibility, and several models of litigation predict this result. The prediction is a fragile one, however, because it implies very restrictive assumptions about the probability distributions of the cases subject to dispute. The period studied includes four Supreme Court decisions widely regarded as changing the rules and altering the level of uncertainty surrounding the legality of the anti-tying provisions of the antitrust laws. Broad trends in antitrust activity generally and changes in firm profitability statistically explain over three-quarters of the observed variation in tying litigation. Changes in legal precedent have only modest effects upon litigation. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2007
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Advances in Economic Research.
Volume (Year): 13 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=112112
common law efficiency; empirical antitrust; tying litigation; K21; L42;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
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