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Central Bank Independence and the Cost of Disinflation: Why the Wage Contracts Length Matters?

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  • Giuseppe Diana

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  • MoÏse Sidiropoulos

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11294-006-9017-3
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Advances in Economic Research.

Volume (Year): 12 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 287-297

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Handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:287-297

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=112112

Related research

Keywords: E52; E58;

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References

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  1. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Ernst Baltensperger & Peter Kugler, 2000. "Central Bank Independence and Sacrifice Ratios: Some Further Considerations," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 111-125, April.
  3. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  4. Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, 1994. "Goals, guidelines, and constraints facing monetary policymakers: an overview," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 3-15.
  5. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
  6. Adam Posen, 1995. "Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link?," Staff Reports 1, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  7. Fischer, Stanley, 1983. "Indexing and inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 519-541, November.
  8. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  9. Gray, Jo Anna, 1976. "Wage indexation: A macroeconomic approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 221-235, April.
  10. Fischer, Stanley & Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Should Governments Learn to Live with Inflation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 382-87, May.
  11. Andreas Fischer, 1996. "Central bank independence and sacrifice ratios," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 5-18, January.
  12. Devereux, Michael, 1987. "The effect of monetary variability on welfare in a simple macroeconomic model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 427-435, May.
  13. Harold Brumm & Richard Krashevski, 2003. "The Sacrifice Ratio and Central Bank Independence Revisited," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 157-168, April.
  14. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  15. W. Wascher & Palle S. Andersen, 1999. "Sacrifice ratios and the conduct of monetary policy in conditions of low inflation," BIS Working Papers 82, Bank for International Settlements.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Peter Howells, 2009. "Independent Central Banks: Some theoretical and empirical problems?," Discussion Papers 0908, University of the West of England, Department of Economics.
  2. Ian Down, 2009. "Central Bank Independence, Disinflations and Monetary Policy," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 1.

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