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Central Bank Independence and the Cost of Disinflation: Why the Wage Contracts Length Matters?

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Author Info
Giuseppe Diana ()
MoÏse Sidiropoulos

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11294-006-9017-3
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Advances in Economic Research.

Volume (Year): 12 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 287-297
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:287-297

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=112112

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Related research
Keywords: E52; E58;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gray, Jo Anna, 1976. "Wage indexation: A macroeconomic approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 221-235, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Fischer, Stanley & Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Should Governments Learn to Live with Inflation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 382-87, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Posen, Adam, 1998. "Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 335-59, July.
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  6. Andreas Fischer, 1996. "Central bank independence and sacrifice ratios," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 5-18, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ernst Baltensperger & Peter Kugler, 2000. "Central Bank Independence and Sacrifice Ratios: Some Further Considerations," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 111-125, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Harold Brumm & Richard Krashevski, 2003. "The Sacrifice Ratio and Central Bank Independence Revisited," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 157-168, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
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  10. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Fischer, Stanley, 1983. "Indexing and inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 519-541, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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