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Restrictions on Competition in Municipal Competitive Procurement in Sweden

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  • Sofia Lundberg

Abstract

The bidding process in public procurement in Sweden is a first-price sealed bid auction. Although there is a competitive effect on the bids in this type of auction, the contracting entity can, through the choice of procurement procedure, restrict the number of bidders. This paper studies this choice and imposes an implementation cost on the contracting entity to motivate such a restriction. The results, based on data for Swedish municipalities, suggest that contract specifications and municipality characteristics (that are assumed to influence the implementation cost) affect the volume of the procurement and the number of bidders but not necessarily the choice of procurement procedure. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Sofia Lundberg, 2005. "Restrictions on Competition in Municipal Competitive Procurement in Sweden," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 11(3), pages 329-342, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:11:y:2005:i:3:p:329-342:10.1007/s11294-005-6661-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11294-005-6661-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gregory Vistnes, 1994. "An Empirical Investigation of Procurement Contract Structures," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 215-241, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ari Hyytinen & Sofia Lundberg & Otto Toivanen, 2018. "Design of public procurement auctions: evidence from cleaning contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(2), pages 398-426, June.
    2. Bergman, Mats A. & Lundberg, Johan & Lundberg, Sofia & Stake, Johan Y., 2015. "Using spatial econometrics to test for collusive behavior in procurement auction data," Umeå Economic Studies 917, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    3. Mats A. Bergman & Johan Lundberg & Sofia Lundberg & Johan Y. Stake, 2020. "Interactions Across Firms and Bid Rigging," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 56(1), pages 107-130, February.
    4. Decio Coviello & Mario Mariniello, 2008. "Does Publicity Affect Competition? Evidence from Discontinuities in Public Procurement Auctions?," Economics Working Papers ECO2008/04, European University Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D44; H57; K20;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General

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