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Restrictions on Competition in Municipal Competitive Procurement in Sweden

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Author Info
Sofia Lundberg

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Abstract

The bidding process in public procurement in Sweden is a first-price sealed bid auction. Although there is a competitive effect on the bids in this type of auction, the contracting entity can, through the choice of procurement procedure, restrict the number of bidders. This paper studies this choice and imposes an implementation cost on the contracting entity to motivate such a restriction. The results, based on data for Swedish municipalities, suggest that contract specifications and municipality characteristics (that are assumed to influence the implementation cost) affect the volume of the procurement and the number of bidders but not necessarily the choice of procurement procedure. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11294-005-6661-y
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Advances in Economic Research.

Volume (Year): 11 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 329-342
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Handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:11:y:2005:i:3:p:329-342

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=112112

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Related research
Keywords: D44; H57; K20;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Herve & Vuong, Quang, 1995. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 953-80, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Gregory Vistnes, 1994. "An Empirical Investigation of Procurement Contract Structures," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 215-241, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Taylor, Curtis R & Wiggins, Steven N, 1997. "Competition or Compensation: Supplier Incentives under the American and Japanese Subcontracting Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 598-618, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Jofre-Bonet, Mireia & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2000. "Bidding behavior in a repeated procurement auction: A summary," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 1006-1020, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Donald, S.G. & Paarsch, H.J., 1992. "Maximum Likelihood Estimation in Empirical Models of Auctions," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9211, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  8. Wang, Ruqu, 2000. "Bidding and renegotiation in procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(8), pages 1577-1597, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Guofu Tan, 1996. "Optimal Procurement Mechanisms for an Informed Buyer," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 699-716, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Decio Coviello & Mario Mariniello, 2008. "Does Publicity Affect Competition? Evidence from Discontinuities in Public Procurement Auctions," CSEF Working Papers 189, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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