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The Probationary Period as a Screening Device: The Monopolistic Insurer

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Author Info
Jaap Spreeuw

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Abstract

Stiglitz [1977], considering asymmetry of information in a monopolistic insurance market and the monetary deductible as a screening device, shows that an equilibrium is always of a separating type. High risks buy complete insurance whilst low risks buy partial insurance. In this paper, we show that a pooling equilibrium may exist if a probationary period, rather than the partial coverage in monetary terms, is used as a screening device. Copyright The Geneva Association 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10836-005-1104-5
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal THE GENEVA RISK AND INSURANCE REVIEW.

Volume (Year): 30 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 5-14
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Handle: RePEc:kap:geneva:v:30:y:2005:i:1:p:5-14

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102897

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Related research
Keywords: probationary periods; adverse selection; monopoly; separating equilibrium; pooling equilibrium;

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