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Continuous-Time Strategy Selection in Linear Population Games

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Author Info
Siegfried Berninghaus
Karl-Martin Ehrhart
Claudia Keser
Abstract

In an experimental evolutionary game framework we investigate whether subjects end up in a socially efficient state. We examine two games, a game where the socially efficient state is also an equilibrium and a game which has no equilibrium in pure strategies at all. Furthermore, we distinguish between a situation in which the subjects are completely informed about the payoff function and a situation in which they are incompletely informed. We observe that subjects spend the greater part of the time at or near the efficient state. If the efficient state is an equilibrium, they spend more time there than otherwise. Furthermore, incomplete information increases the time spent at the efficient state. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1009977715310
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.

Volume (Year): 2 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
Pages: 41-57
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Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:2:y:1999:i:1:p:41-57

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Carlson, John A & McAfee, R Preston, 1983. "Discrete Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 480-93, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 1998. "Time horizon and equilibrium selection in tacit coordination games: Experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 231-248, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Edward L. Millner & Michael D. Pratt & Robert J. Reilly, 1990. "Contestability in Real-Time Experimental Flow Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 584-599, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Berninghaus, Siegfried, 1984. "A general existence theorem for equilibrium price dispersions," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 239-266. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Siegfried Berninghaus & Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Marion Ott & Bodo Vogt, 2007. "Evolution of networks—an experimental analysis," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 317-347, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Siegfried Berninghaus & Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Marion Ott, 2006. "A network experiment in continuous time: The influence of link costs," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 237-251, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2008. "Myopically Forward-Looking Agents in a Network Formation Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 08-02, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  4. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion & Vogt, Bodo, 2004. "Searching for "Stars" - Recent Experimental Results on Network Formation -," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-34, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  5. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2005. "A Network Experiment in Continuous Time:," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 05-02, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
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