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Piercing the Veil of Uncertainty in Transboundary Pollution Agreements

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  • Charles Kolstad

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of how uncertainty in costs and benefits affects the difficulty of reaching a voluntary agreement among sovereign states. A measure of “difficulty” is constructed related to side-payments necessary to make an agreement a Pareto-improving move. Using a simple model, it is shown that uncertainty actually makes agreement easier. Copyright Springer 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Kolstad, 2005. "Piercing the Veil of Uncertainty in Transboundary Pollution Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(1), pages 21-34, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:31:y:2005:i:1:p:21-34
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-004-6980-0
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Finus, Michael & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2013. "The role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 29-43.
    2. Anwesha Banerjee & Nicolas Gravel, 2020. "Contribution to a public good under subjective uncertainty," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 473-500, June.
    3. Michael Finus & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2012. "International environmental agreements under uncertainty: does the 'veil of uncertainty' help?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(4), pages 736-764, October.
    4. Boucher, Vincent & Bramoullé, Yann, 2010. "Providing global public goods under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 591-603, October.
    5. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4069 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Julien Chevallier, 2009. "Intertemporal Emissions Trading and Market Power: A Dominant Firm with Competitive Fringe Model," Working Papers halshs-00388207, HAL.
    7. Julien Chevallier, 2007. "A differential game of intertemporal emissions trading with market power," Working Papers hal-04139220, HAL.
    8. Fridrik M. Baldursson, Ewa Lazarczyk, Marten Ovaere, and Stef Proost, 2018. "Cross-Border Exchange and Sharing of Generation Reserve Capacity," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4).
    9. Aurélie Slechten, 2020. "Environmental Agreements under Asymmetric Information," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(3), pages 455-481.
    10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4228 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Anwesha Banerjee & Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad, 2022. "Climate Policy, Irreversibilities and Global Economic Shocks," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2022-11, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    12. Pierre-André Jouvet & Fabien Prieur, 2006. "Permis de pollution et contraintes politiques dans un modèle à générations imbriquées," EconomiX Working Papers 2006-21, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    13. Vincent Boucher & Yann Bramoullé, 2007. "Risk Aversion and International Environmental Agreements," Cahiers de recherche 0739, CIRPEE.
    14. Alfred Endres, 2008. "Ein Unmöglichkeitstheorem für die Klimapolitik?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(3), pages 350-382, August.
    15. Julien Chevallier, 2009. "Intertemporal Emissions Trading and Allocation Rules: Gainers, Losers and the Spectre of Market Power," Working Papers halshs-00124713, HAL.
    16. Kolstad, Charles D., 2007. "Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 68-79, January.
    17. Kolstad Charles D, 2010. "Equity, Heterogeneity and International Environmental Agreements," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-17, October.

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