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Piercing the Veil of Uncertainty in Transboundary Pollution Agreements

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  • Charles Kolstad

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Abstract

This paper addresses the question of how uncertainty in costs and benefits affects the difficulty of reaching a voluntary agreement among sovereign states. A measure of “difficulty” is constructed related to side-payments necessary to make an agreement a Pareto-improving move. Using a simple model, it is shown that uncertainty actually makes agreement easier. Copyright Springer 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10640-004-6980-0
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental & Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 31 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (05)
Pages: 21-34

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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:31:y:2005:i:1:p:21-34

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

Related research

Keywords: international environmental agreements; pollution; side-payments; transboundary uncertainty; treaties;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Michael Finus & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2010. "International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty: Does the Veil of Uncertainty Help?," Discussion Papers 1003, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  2. Finus, Michael & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2013. "The role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 29-43.
  3. Julien Pierre Chevallier, 2007. "A differential game of intertemporal emissions trading with market power," EconomiX Working Papers 2007-18, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  4. Boucher, Vincent & Bramoullé, Yann, 2010. "Providing global public goods under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 591-603, October.
  5. Julien Chevallier, 2009. "Intertemporal Emissions Trading and Allocation Rules: Gainers, Losers and the Spectre of Market Power," Working Papers halshs-00124713, HAL.
  6. Julien Chevallier, 2009. "Intertemporal Emissions Trading and Market Power: A Dominant Firm with Competitive Fringe Model," Working Papers halshs-00388207, HAL.
  7. Alfred Endres, 2008. "Ein Unmöglichkeitstheorem für die Klimapolitik?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(3), pages 350-382, 08.
  8. Kolstad, Charles D., 2007. "Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 68-79, January.
  9. Bayramoglu, Basak & Jacques, Jean-François, 2012. "International negotiations on the environment : Uniform vs. differentiated standards," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4069, Paris Dauphine University.
  10. Pierre-André Jouvet & Fabien Prieur, 2006. "Permis de pollution et contraintes politiques dans un modèle à générations imbriquées," EconomiX Working Papers 2006-21, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  11. Vincent Boucher & Yann Bramoullé, 2007. "Risk Aversion and International Environmental Agreements," Cahiers de recherche 0739, CIRPEE.

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