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Piercing the Veil of Uncertainty in Transboundary Pollution Agreements

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Author Info
Charles Kolstad ()

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Abstract

This paper addresses the question of how uncertainty in costs and benefits affects the difficulty of reaching a voluntary agreement among sovereign states. A measure of “difficulty” is constructed related to side-payments necessary to make an agreement a Pareto-improving move. Using a simple model, it is shown that uncertainty actually makes agreement easier. Copyright Springer 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10640-004-6980-0
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Publisher Info
Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental & Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 31 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (05)
Pages: 21-34
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:31:y:2005:i:1:p:21-34

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: international environmental agreements; pollution; side-payments; transboundary uncertainty; treaties;

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Julien Pierre Chevallier, 2007. "A differential game of intertemporal emissions trading with market power," EconomiX Working Papers 2007-18, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX. [Downloadable!]
  2. Julien Chevallier, 2009. "Intertemporal Emissions Trading and Allocation Rules: Gainers, Losers and the Spectre of Market Power," Working Papers halshs-00124713_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  3. Pierre-André Jouvet & Fabien Prieur, 2006. "Permis de pollution et contraintes politiques dans un modèle à générations imbriquées," EconomiX Working Papers 2006-21, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX. [Downloadable!]
  4. Vincent Boucher & Yann Bramoullé, 2007. "Risk Aversion and International Environmental Agreements," Cahiers de recherche 0739, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
  5. Julien Chevallier, 2009. "Intertemporal Emissions Trading and Market Power: A Dominant Firm with Competitive Fringe Model," Working Papers halshs-00388207_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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