A Note on Defensive Expenditures: Harmonised Law, Diverse Results
AbstractIn the context of many environmental hazards there is scope for self-defence by victims. Multiple equilibria arise in a model of bilateral precaution under a regime of strict but incompletely enforced environmental liability. This means that the same system of environmental law instigated in two economies may lead to very different outcomes. It impacts upon policy analysis in a variety of ways and provides a channel for ``cultural factors'' to matter. We explore the positive and normative effects of subsidising self-defence. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 19 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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