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Can the ECB be Truly Independent? Should It Be? Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Maria Demertzis
Andrew Hughes Hallett
Nicola Viegi
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Empirica .
Volume (Year): 26 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 217-240
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Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:26:y:1999:i:3:p:217-240Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100261
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Keywords: Asymmetries ; cooperation ; fiscal-monetary interactions ; incentives for independence ; monetary union ; References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995.
"Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost? ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Frankel, Jeffrey A & Rose, Andrew K, 1998.
"The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1009-25, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Marta Campillo & Jeffrey A. Miron, 1996.
"Why Does Inflation Differ Across Countries? ,"
NBER Working Papers
5540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1998.
"Independently Blue? Accountability and Independence in the New European Central Bank ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1842, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rankin, Neil, 1998.
"Is Delegating Half of Demand Management Sensible? ,"
International Review of Applied Economics ,
Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 415-22, September.
Other versions: Michael Woodford, 1995.
"Price Level Determinacy Without Control of a Monetary Aggregate ,"
NBER Working Papers
5204, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Gilles Oudiz & Jeffrey Sachs, 1985.
"International Policy Coordination In Dynamic Macroeconomic Models ,"
NBER Chapters ,
in: International Economic Policy Coordination, pages 274-330
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]
Leith, Campbell & Wren-Lewis, Simon, 2000.
"Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages C93-108, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993.
"Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence ,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Artis, Michael J & Winkler, Bernhard, 1997.
"The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the Credibility of the European Central Bank ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1688, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1999.
"An Independent Central Bank Faced With Elected Governments ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2219, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Viegi, Nicola, 2001.
"Credibility, Transparency and Asymmetric Information in Monetary Policy ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2671, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
M. Demertzis & A. Hughes Hallett & N. Viegi, 2002.
"An Independent Central Bank faced with Elected Government: A Political Economy Conflict ,"
WO Research Memoranda (discontinued)
686, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
Andrew Hallett & Nicola Viegi, 2002.
"Inflation Targeting as a Coordination Device ,"
Open Economies Review ,
Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 341-362, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Andrew Hughes Hallett & Maria Demertzis, .
"When can an Independent Central Bank offer lower Inflation at no Cost? A Political Economy Analysis ,"
EPRU Working Paper Series
00-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
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