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Race, politics, and punishment

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  • Peter T. Leeson

    (George Mason University)

  • Russell S. Sobel

    (West Virginia University)

Abstract

This paper empirically evaluates two competing theories of electoral accountability in the context of New Orleans’ 2006 mayoral election. According to the democratic efficiency theory, voters can successfully punish ineffective political agents by removing them from office. In contrast, the public choice theory argues that the bundled nature of political goods prevents voters from successfully holding ineffective politicians accountable. We find that although there is limited support for the punishment effect predicted by the democratic efficiency theory, this effect is overwhelmed by the fact that the bundle of goods politicians offer contains elements that pull in opposing directions. This prevents the punishment effect from having any real impact, leading to democratic failure. Our results support the public choice theory of electoral (un)accountability.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter T. Leeson & Russell S. Sobel, 2011. "Race, politics, and punishment," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 265-285, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:31:y:2011:i:3:d:10.1007_s10657-011-9228-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-011-9228-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Abney, F. Glenn & Hill, Larry B., 1966. "Natural Disasters as a Political Variable: The Effect of a Hurricane on an Urban Election," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 974-981, December.
    2. Russell Sobel & Peter Leeson, 2006. "Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 55-73, April.
    3. Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel, 2003. "The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(3), pages 496-509, July.
    4. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    5. William Shughart, 2006. "Katrinanomics: The politics and economics of disaster relief," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 31-53, April.
    6. Peter T. Leeson & Russell S. Sobel, 2008. "Weathering Corruption," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(4), pages 667-681, November.
    7. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
    8. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Muhammad Habibur Rahman & Nejat Anbarci & Prasad Sankar Bhattacharya & Mehmet Ali Ulubaşoğlu, 2017. "Can extreme rainfall trigger democratic change? The role of flood-induced corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(3), pages 331-358, June.
    2. Muhammad Habibur Rahman & Nejat Anbarci & Prasad Sankar Bhattacharya & Mehmet Ali Ulubaşoğlu, 2017. "The Shocking Origins of Political Transitions: Evidence from Earthquakes," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(3), pages 796-823, January.
    3. Chun-Ping Chang & Aziz N. Berdiev, 2015. "Do natural disasters increase the likelihood that a government is replaced?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(17), pages 1788-1808, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democratic failure; Hurricane Katrina; New Orleans;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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