Ex Ante and Ex Post Allocation of Risk of Illegality: Regulatory Sources of Contractual Failure and Issues of Corrective and Distributive Justice
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 13 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100264
risk; regulation; illegality; contractual railure; rights; efficiency; distributive and corrective justice;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gillette, Clayton P, 1990. "Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 535-81, June.
- Scott, Robert E, 1990. "A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 597-616, June.
- Trimarchi, Pietro, 1991. "Commercial impracticability in contract law: An economic analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 63-82, May.
- Beales, Howard & Craswell, Richard & Salop, Steven C, 1981. "The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 491-539, December.
- Ehrlich, Isaac, 1982. "The optimum enforcement of laws and the concept of justice: A positive analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 3-27, June.
- Trebilcock, Michael J, 1988. "The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of Efficient Civil Liability Rules," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 243-65, Fall.
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