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• Volker Meier

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Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 12 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 47-56
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Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:12:y:2001:i:1:p:47-56

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Keywords: criminal law; optimal punishment;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Leung, Siu Fai, 1995. "Dynamic Deterrence Theory," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 62(245), pages 65-87, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Leung, S.F., 1993. "Dynamic Deterence Theory," RCER Working Papers 366, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
3. O'Flaherty, Brendan, 1998. "Why Repeated Criminal Opportunities Matter: A Dynamic Stochastic Analysis of Criminal Decision Making," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 232-55, October.
4. Kenneth L. Avio, 1973. "An Economic Analysis of Criminal Corrections: The Canadian Case," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 6(2), pages 164-78, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
6. Fabel, Oliver & Meier, Volker, 1999. "Optimal parole decisions1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 159-166, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Tauchen, Helen & Witte, Ann Dryden & Griesinger, Harriet, 1994. "Criminal Deterrence: Revisiting the Issue with a Birth Cohort," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(3), pages 399-412, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Shavell, Steven, 1987. "A Model of Optimal Incapacitation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 107-10, May.
9. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1981. "On the Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation, and Deterrence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 307-22, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Mitchell Polinsky, A. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1991. "A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 291-306, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1993. "A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders," NBER Working Papers 3739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. repec:att:wimass:199526 is not listed on IDEAS

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