Emerging from the Hobbesian jungle: Might takes and makes rights
AbstractThe conflict over scarce resources in the Hobbesian jungle may be avoided if rules of obligation delineating property rights develop along with institutions of governance. One possibility is a “duress contract” as the strongest individual threatens others who agree to enslavement. Thus, “might takes rights.” Alternatively, individuals with similar capacities for violence may enter a “consent contract” establishing rules of obligation and then voluntarily participating in governance. They will not agree to a rights assignment that produces less wealth than they expect through violence, however, so “might makes rights.” A might-takes-and-makes-rights analysis is outlined to explain the continuum of legal institutions and property rights allocations that can evolve between these two extremes of duress and consent. Increasingly finely delineated private property rights tend to evolve under institutions produced by consent contracts, while common pool problems tend to arise near the duress contract end of the spectrum. Copyright George Mason University 1994
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 5 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866
K40; D23; D7;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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- Viktor Vanberg & Wolfgang Kerber, 1994. "Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 193-219, March.
- Ejan Mackaay, 1997. "The Emergence of Constitutional Rights," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-36, March.
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