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From scholarly idea to budgetary institution: the emergence of cost-benefit analysis

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  • Michael Makowsky
  • Richard Wagner

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  • Michael Makowsky & Richard Wagner, 2009. "From scholarly idea to budgetary institution: the emergence of cost-benefit analysis," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 57-70, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:20:y:2009:i:1:p:57-70
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-008-9051-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
    2. Nyborg, Karine, 1998. "Some Norwegian Politicians' Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(3-4), pages 381-401, June.
    3. Hahn Robert W. & Litan Robert E., 2007. "The President's New Executive Order on Regulation," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 1-4, March.
    4. Warren J. Samuels, 1992. "The Physiocratic Theory of Economic Policy," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Essays in the History of Mainstream Political Economy, chapter 2, pages 28-46, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. Wagner, Richard E., 2005. "Self-governance, polycentrism, and federalism: recurring themes in Vincent Ostrom's scholarly oeuvre," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 173-188, June.
    6. Richard E. Wagner, 2007. "Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12713.
    7. Williams, Alan, 1972. "Cost-benefit analysis: Bastard science? and/or insidious poison in the body politick?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 199-225, August.
    8. Becker, Gary S, 2000. "A Comment on the Conference on Cost-Benefit Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 1149-1152, June.
    9. Howitt, Peter & Clower, Robert, 2000. "The emergence of economic organization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 55-84, January.
    10. Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, 2007. "How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Benefit-Cost Analysis?," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 1(2), pages 192-211, Summer.
    11. Juergen Backhaus & Richard Wagner, 1987. "The cameralists: A public choice perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 3-20, January.
    12. Richardson, Henry S, 2000. "The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 971-1003, June.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Tiwari, Sweta & Coble, Keith & Harri, Ardian & Barnett, Barry, 2017. "Hedging the Price Risk of Crop Revenue Insurance Through the Options Market," 2017 Annual Meeting, February 4-7, 2017, Mobile, Alabama 253081, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Emergence of institutions; Cost-benefit analysis; Agenda setting; Polycentrism; D02; D23; D61; D78; H11; H83; P16;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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