Same players, different game: how better rules make better politics
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 19 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866
Rules of the game; Constitutional choice; D70; H00;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
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- Boettke, Peter & Fink, Alexander, 2011.
32093, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hansson, Åsa & Porter, Susan & Perry Williams, Susan, 2012. "The Effect of Political and Economic Factors on Corporate Tax Rates," Working Paper Series 942, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- T. Durant, 2011. "Making executive politics mutually productive and fair," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 141-172, June.
- Vanberg, Georg, 2011. "Substance vs. procedure: Constitutional enforcement and constitutional choice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 309-318.
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