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Lawyers and politicians: the impact of organized legal professions on institutional reforms

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Author Info
Peter Grajzl ()
Peter Murrell ()

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Abstract

Organized legal professions often play a central role in successful institutional development. The paper’s model examines how legal professions affect institutional reform. Professional review of reform proposals solves a politician’s informational problem in a way that makes democracy, political stability, and professional power substitutes. The model’s applicability is examined by showing that its predictions track the fortunes of lawyers in the USSR and early transition and are consistent with events in 1688 in England and 1789 in France, indicating why these two revolutions had different consequences. The model suggests why and when civil law and common law systems differ. Copyright Economic Science Association 2006

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10602-006-9006-9
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 17 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 251-276
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:17:y:2006:i:4:p:251-276

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866

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Related research
Keywords: Organised legal profession; Institutional reform; Interest groups; Civil law and common law; Soviet Union; Glorious Revolution; D72; D82; H10; K40; N40; P51;

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  2. Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-27, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Poole, Keith T & Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1987. "The Revealed Preferences of Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 298-302, May.
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  9. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2003. "Law and finance: why does legal origin matter?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 653-675, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 131-165, 06. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Stratmann, Thomas, 1995. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 77(1), pages 127-36, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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