The Independence of the Italian Constitutional Court
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 14 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866
independence; courts; judges; Italy;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Breton, Albert & Fraschini, Angela, 2003. " Vertical Competition in Unitary States: The Case of Italy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(1-2), pages 57-77, January.
- Fabio Padovano, 2009. "The time-varying independence of Italian peak judicial institutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 230-250, September.
- Padovano, Fabio & Fiorino, Nadia, 2012. "Strategic delegation and “judicial couples” in the Italian Constitutional Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 215-223.
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