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Climate Coalitions in an Integrated Assessment Model

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  • Tol, Richard S J

Abstract

An analytically tractable approximation of a numerical model is used to investigate coalition formation between nine major world regions with regard to their policies for greenhouse gas emission reduction. Full cooperation is not individually rational. Assuming non-transferable utility, side payments do not ensure full cooperation either. Without side payments, the largest stable coalitions are small and consist of similar regions. With side payments, the largest stable coalitions exclude either the main culprits or the main victims of climate change. In all cases, optimal emission control is modest. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Society for Computational Economics in its journal Computational Economics.

Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 159-72

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Handle: RePEc:kap:compec:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:159-72

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100248
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Cited by:
  1. EYCKMANS, Johan & FINUS, Michael, 2003. "Coalition formation in a global warming game : how the design of protocols affects the success of environmental treaty-making," CORE Discussion Papers 2003088, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Axel Michaelowa & Richard Tol, 2002. "Outlook for the International Climate Policy Regime– Revolution or Reform?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 217-219, September.
  3. Peter Egger & Christoph Jeßberger & Mario Larch, 2011. "Trade and investment liberalization as determinants of multilateral environmental agreement membership," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 18(6), pages 605-633, December.
  4. Carbone, Jared C. & Helm, Carsten & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2009. "The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 266-280, November.
  5. Fabio Sferra & Massimo Tavoni, 2013. "Endogenous Participation in a Partial Climate Agreement with Open Entry: A Numerical Assessment," Working Papers 2013.60, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  6. Andries Hof & Michel Elzen & Detlef Vuuren, 2009. "Environmental effectiveness and economic consequences of fragmented versus universal regimes: what can we learn from model studies?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 39-62, February.
  7. Birgit Bednar-Friedl, 2012. "Climate policy targets in emerging and industrialized economies: the influence of technological differences, environmental preferences and propensity to save," Empirica, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 191-215, May.
  8. Marta Biancardi & Giovanni Villani, 2010. "International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 36(1), pages 69-92, June.
  9. Rob Dellink & Michael Finus & Niels Olieman, 2008. "The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(4), pages 357-377, April.

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