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The effects of ownership concentration and corporate debt on corporate divestitures in Chinese listed firms

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Author Info

  • Jianfeng Wu

    ()

  • Dean Xu

    ()

  • Phillip Phan

    ()

Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Asia Pacific Journal of Management.

Volume (Year): 28 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 95-114

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Handle: RePEc:kap:asiapa:v:28:y:2011:i:1:p:95-114

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Postal: P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, the Netherlands
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=106589

Related research

Keywords: Corporate divestitures; Ownership concentration; Corporate debt; State control; Principal–principal conflicts; China;

References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Marianne Bertrand & Paras Mehta & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2000. "Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups," NBER Working Papers 7952, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," NBER Working Papers 5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Haynes, Michelle & Thompson, Steve & Wright, Mike, 2003. "The determinants of corporate divestment: evidence from a panel of UK firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 147-166, September.
  4. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," NBER Working Papers 6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Schleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2001. "Investor Protection and Corporate Governance," Working Paper Series rwp01-017, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  6. Michael N. Young & Mike W. Peng & David Ahlstrom & Garry D. Bruton & Yi Jiang, 2008. "Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal-Principal Perspective," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 196-220, 01.
  7. Roll, Richard, 1986. "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 197-216, April.
  8. Brickley, James A. & Lease, Ronald C. & Smith, Clifford Jr., 1988. "Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 267-291, January.
  9. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
  10. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Scholarly Articles 3606237, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
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  14. Larry H. P. Lang & Mara Faccio & Leslie Young, 2001. "Dividends and Expropriation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 54-78, March.
  15. Amar Bhide, 1989. "The Causes And Consequences Of Hostile Takeovers," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 2(2), pages 36-59.
  16. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1990. " Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 31-48, March.
  17. Rafael La porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2002. "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1147-1170, 06.
  18. Hausman, Jerry & Hall, Bronwyn H & Griliches, Zvi, 1984. "Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 909-38, July.
  19. FFF1Jitka NNN1Rychtarikova, 2004. "The case of the Czech Republic," Demographic Research Special Collections, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany, vol. 2(5), pages 105-138, April.
  20. Peng, Mike W. & Lu, Yuan & Shenkar, Oded & Wang, Denis Y. L., 2001. "Treasures in the China house: a review of management and organizational research on Greater China," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 95-110, May.
  21. Xu, Xiaonian & Wang, Yan, 1999. "Ownership structure and corporate governance in Chinese stock companies," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 75-98.
  22. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov & Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, 2002. "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2741-2771, December.
  23. Rabi Bhagat & Annette McDevitt & Ian McDevitt, 2010. "On improving the robustness of Asian management theories: Theoretical anchors in the era of globalization," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 179-192, June.
  24. Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, 1999. "Banks and Corporate Control in Japan," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 54(1), pages 319-339, 02.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Yuting Huang & Anlin Chen & Lanfeng Kao, 2012. "Corporate governance in Taiwan: The nonmonotonic relationship between family ownership and dividend policy," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 39-58, March.
  2. Steve Sauerwald & Mike Peng, 2013. "Informal institutions, shareholder coalitions, and principal–principal conflicts," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 853-870, September.
  3. Yi Jiang & Mike Peng, 2011. "Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant?," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 15-39, March.
  4. Steven Globerman & Mike Peng & Daniel Shapiro, 2011. "Corporate governance and Asian companies," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-14, March.

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