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Power delegation and the European Central Bank's democratic deficit

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  • Nazli Aziz

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  • Nazli Aziz, 2005. "Power delegation and the European Central Bank's democratic deficit," Asia Europe Journal, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 537-550, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:asiaeu:v:3:y:2005:i:4:p:537-550
    DOI: 10.1007/s10308-005-0018-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Giandomenico Majone, 2001. "Two Logics of Delegation," European Union Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 103-122, February.
    2. Willem H. Buiter, 1999. "Alice in Euroland," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 181-209, June.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    4. Pollack, Mark A., 1997. "Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 99-134, January.
    5. Otmar Issing, 2002. "On Macroeconomic Policy Co‐ordination in EMU," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 345-358, June.
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