This paper evaluates effects on tax compliance of simple reforms in personnel policy in the Indian income tax administration. Taxpayers voluntarily disclosing higher incomes are currently assigned to special assessment units. To avoid this, high income taxpayers have an added incentive to understate their incomes. Empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis is found. It explains spillover effects of enforcement efforts across assessment units. We incorporate these spillovers in estimating revenue effects of increased support staff. The results imply significant compliance gains would accrue from expanded staff employment and changes in assignment procedures for staff and taxpayers. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
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Volume (Year): 11 (2004) Issue (Month): 5 (September) Pages: 575-600 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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