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Switching to a poor business activity: optimal capital structure, agency costs and covenant rules

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  • Jean-Paul Décamps
  • Bertrand Djembissi

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  • Jean-Paul Décamps & Bertrand Djembissi, 2007. "Switching to a poor business activity: optimal capital structure, agency costs and covenant rules," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 389-409, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:annfin:v:3:y:2007:i:3:p:389-409
    DOI: 10.1007/s10436-006-0049-8
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    1. Goldstein, Robert & Ju, Nengjiu & Leland, Hayne, 2001. "An EBIT-Based Model of Dynamic Capital Structure," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(4), pages 483-512, October.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Decamps, Jean-Paul & Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, 2002. "Excessive continuation and dynamic agency costs of debt," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1623-1644, October.
    4. Mauer, David C. & Sarkar, Sudipto, 2005. "Real options, agency conflicts, and optimal capital structure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 1405-1428, June.
    5. Leland, Hayne E, 1994. "Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1213-1252, September.
    6. Hayne E. Leland, 1998. "Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1213-1243, August.
    7. Leland, Hayne E & Toft, Klaus Bjerre, 1996. "Optimal Capital Structure, Endogenous Bankruptcy, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(3), pages 987-1019, July.
    8. Fan, Hua & Sundaresan, Suresh M, 2000. "Debt Valuation, Renegotiation, and Optimal Dividend Policy," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(4), pages 1057-1099.
    9. John R. Graham, 2000. "How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(5), pages 1901-1941, October.
    10. Childs, Paul D. & Mauer, David C. & Ott, Steven H., 2005. "Interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions: The effects of agency conflicts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 667-690, June.
    11. Parrino, Robert & Weisbach, Michael S., 1999. "Measuring investment distortions arising from stockholder-bondholder conflicts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 3-42, July.
    12. Anderson, Ronald W & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Design and Valuation of Debt Contracts," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 37-68.
    13. Hayne E. Leland, 2007. "Financial Synergies and the Optimal Scope of the Firm: Implications for Mergers, Spinoffs, and Structured Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(2), pages 765-807, April.
    14. Mauer, David C & Triantis, Alexander J, 1994. "Interactions of Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions: A Dynamic Framework," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1253-1277, September.
    15. In Joon Kim & Krishna Ramaswamy & Suresh Sundaresan, 1993. "Does Default Risk in Coupons Affect the Valuation of Corporate Bonds?: A Contingent Claims Model," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 22(3), Fall.
    16. Robert R. Bliss, 2001. "Market discipline and subordinated debt: a review of some salient issues," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 25(Q I), pages 24-45.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kuersten, Wolfgang & Linde, Rainer, 2011. "Corporate hedging versus risk-shifting in financially constrained firms: The time-horizon matters!," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 502-525, June.
    2. Agliardi, Elettra & Andergassen, Rainer, 2009. "Last resort gambles, risky debt and liquidation policy," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 142-155, August.
    3. repec:rim:rimwps:31-07 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Djembissi, Bertrand, 2011. "Excessive risk taking and the maturity structure of debt," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 1800-1816, October.
    5. Emilio Barucci & Luca Del Viva, 2013. "Dynamic capital structure and the contingent capital option," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 337-364, August.
    6. Kit Wong, 2010. "On the neutrality of debt in investment intensity," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 335-356, July.
    7. Joel M. Vanden, 2016. "Optimal capital structures for private firms," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 245-273, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capital structure; Stockholder–debtholder conflict; Covenant rules; G30; G32; G33;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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