Do Team-Specific Revenues Matter in Baseball’s Arbitration System?
AbstractAccording to baseball’s collective bargaining agreement, arbitrators may not consider team finances when rendering a decision. The author develops two theories to examine the setting of final offers. In the first theory, final offers are simply functions of the arbitral criteria and are, therefore, not a function of the revenue-generating capability of the team. In the second theory, the author argues that teams may trade some talented and, thus, high-priced arbitrationeligible players, resulting in an implicit premium embedded in the final offers. The empirical analysis suggests that there are no such premiums embedded in the final offers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Fitness Information Technology in its journal International Journal of Sport Finance.
Volume (Year): 1 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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Web page: http://www.fitinfotech.com/
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