Property Assessments and Information Asymmetry in Residential Real Estate
AbstractThis paper presents a game theoretic model of property tax assessment that allows a tax appraiser to either choose a high or a low assessment. The owner either accepts or challenges this assessment. A ‘‘fixed effects’’ regression model is used to evaluate the differences in the assessed values of a sample of houses from Bexar County, Texas during 2000 and 2001. Where the owner of the house is identified as a state licensed property tax consultant, the assessed value, after adjusting for size, age, and other economic characteristics, ranged from a statistically robust 2.5% to 6.2% lower than neighboring houses.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Real Estate Society in its journal journal of Real Estate Research.
Volume (Year): 28 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Contact details of provider:
Postal: American Real Estate Society Clemson University School of Business & Behavioral Science Department of Finance 401 Sirrine Hall Clemson, SC 29634-1323
Web page: http://www.aresnet.org/
Postal: Diane Quarles American Real Estate Society Manager of Member Services Clemson University Box 341323 Clemson, SC 29634-1323
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services
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Journal of Economic Theory,
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