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Reit Organizational Structure and Operating Characteristics

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Author Info
Brent W. Ambrose () (University of Kentucky, Lexington)
Peter Linneman () (University of Pennsylvania)

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Abstract

As a corporate organizational form, real estate investment trusts (REITs) fall into two competing property management structures: internally advised and externally advised. This study tests the hypothesis that, due to their superior ability to resolve conflicts of interests between REIT management and shareholders, internally-advised REITs will dominate the externally-advised REITs. We also test the hypothesis that larger REITs will come to dominate the market and find support for this hypothesis. The results confirm that externally-advised REITs are responding to market pressure to conform to the performance standards set by newer, internally-advised REITs.

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File URL: http://aux.zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/jrer/papers/pdf/past/vol21n03/orgstruc.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Real Estate Society in its journal Journal of Real Estate Research.

Volume (Year): 21 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 141-162
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:jre:issued:v:21:n:3:2001:p:141-162

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Postal: American Real Estate Society Clemson University School of Business & Behavioral Science Department of Finance 401 Sirrine Hall Clemson, SC 29634-1323
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Web page: http://www.aresnet.org/

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Postal: Diane Quarles American Real Estate Society Manager of Member Services Clemson University Box 341323 Clemson, SC 29634-1323
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Web: http://aux.zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/jrer/about/get.htm

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Peihwang Wei & Cheng-Ho Hsieh & C. F. Sirmans, 1995. "Captive Financing Arrangements and Information Asymmetry: The Case of REITs," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 385-394. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Capozza, Dennis R & Seguin, Paul J, 2000. "Debt, Agency, and Management Contracts in REITs: The External Advisor Puzzle," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 91-116, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bing Han, 2006. "Insider Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 471-493, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Han, Bing, 2004. "Insider Ownership and Corporate Value: Evidences from Real Estate Investment Trust," Working Paper Series 2004-1, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Fayez A. Elayan & Thomas O. Meyer & Jingyu Li, 2006. "Evidence from Tax-Exempt Firms on Motives for Participating in Sale-Leaseback Agreements," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 28(4), pages 381-410. [Downloadable!]
  4. William Hardin & Michael Highfield & Matthew Hill & G. Kelly, 2009. "The Determinants of REIT Cash Holdings," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 39-57, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Stephen M. Miller & Thomas M. Springer, 2007. "Cost Improvements, Returns to Scale, and Cost Inefficiencies for Real Estate Investment Trusts," Working papers 2007-05, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Piet Eichholtz & Nils Kok, 2008. "How Does the Market for Corporate Control Function for Property Companies?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 141-163, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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