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Strategic bias and professional affiliations of macroeconomic forecasters

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  • Masahiro Ashiya

    (Faculty of Economics, Kobe University, Japan)

Abstract

This paper investigates strategic motives of macroeconomic forecasters and the effect of their professional affiliations. The 'wishful expectations hypothesis' suggests that a forecaster predicts what his employer wishes. The 'publicity hypothesis' argues that forecasters are evaluated by both accuracy and ability to generate publicity, and that forecasters in industries that emphasize publicity most will make most extreme and least accurate predictions. The 'signaling hypothesis' asserts that an extreme forecast signals confidence in own ability, because incompetent forecasters would mimic others to avoid public notice. Empirical evidence from a 26-year panel of annual GDP forecasts is con-sistent with the publicity hypothesis. This indicates that conventional tests of rationality are biased toward rejecting the rational expectations hypothesis. Copyright ? 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/for.1095
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Journal of Forecasting.

Volume (Year): 28 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 120-130

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Handle: RePEc:jof:jforec:v:28:y:2009:i:2:p:120-130

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Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/2966

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Cited by:
  1. Peter Tillmann, 2010. "Strategic Forecasting on the FOMC," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201017, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  2. Monique Reid & Stan Du Plessis, 2011. "Talking to the inattentive public: How the media translates the Reserve Bank’s communications," Working Papers 254, Economic Research Southern Africa.
  3. Martha A. Starr, 2012. "Contributions of Economists to the Housing-Price Bubble," Journal of Economic Issues, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 46(1), pages 143-172, March.
  4. Monique Reid & Stan du Plessis, 2011. "Talking to the inattentive Public: How the media translates the Reserve Bank’s communications," Working Papers 19/2011, Stellenbosch University, Department of Economics.
  5. Fujiwara, Ippei & Ichiue, Hibiki & Nakazono, Yoshiyuki & Shigemi, Yosuke, 2013. "Financial markets forecasts revisited: Are they rational, stubborn or jumpy?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 526-530.

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