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Logik des Marktes Marktordnung, Marktverhalten und Marktergebnisse / Logic of Markets Market Rules, Behaviour of Actors, and Market Outcome

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  • Gudehus Timm

    (Strandweg 54, 22587 Hamburg, Germany)

Abstract

This contribution shows how the outcome of dynamic markets can be derived, without the unrealistic assumptions of a perfect market, from the current rules of a market and the possible behaviour of the actors. An analysis of the observable rules for real-life markets results in transfer equations and algorithms for the calculation of the individual purchasing prices and sales quantities.With distribution functions for offer and demand, which reflect the behaviour of the actors, the collective market outcome can be calculated, such as market price and sales, their variance and time dependency as well as the distribution effects of markets. The market laws, which result by simulation and probability theory, deviate in many respects from the statements of common price- and market-theories. The new approach enables to solve current problems, such as the market design for material and immaterial goods and finance products.

Suggested Citation

  • Gudehus Timm, 2010. "Logik des Marktes Marktordnung, Marktverhalten und Marktergebnisse / Logic of Markets Market Rules, Behaviour of Actors, and Market Outcome," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 230(5), pages 601-629, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:230:y:2010:i:5:p:601-629
    DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2010-0506
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1990. "Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(1), pages 63-78.
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