We investigate wage-hours contracts within a four-period rent sharing model that incorporates asymmetric information. Distinctions aremade among (a) an investment period, (b) a period in which the partiesmay separate (quits or layoffs) or continue rent accumulation and sharing, (c) a post investment period and, (d) retirement.We establish that increases in both wage rates and hours of work in the post-investment period serve to minimise sub-optimal separations and, moreover that both wage and hours schedules are concave. Testing is based on 13 waves of British Household Panel Survey from 1991 to 2003.
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Article provided by Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics in its journal Journal of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): 228 (2008) Issue (Month): 5-6 (December) Pages: 446-464 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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