Vertragswettbewerb im Gesundheitswesen
AbstractGermany spends more than 11% of GDP on health care – after the US and Switzerland the third most expensive system in the world. At the same time, healthy life expectancy is just about average among the OECD countries. This indicates that the German health care system suffers from inefficiency. Other OECD countries, notably Sweden, achieve much higher healthy life expectancies at considerably lower costs. This paper addresses how the efficiency of the German health care system should be improved upon. Our central argument departs from the well-known observation that information about efficient health care procedures and technologies is asymmetric: insurances know better than consumers which doctors and hospital deliver high quality at lower prices. Hence, the role of health insurances as information mediators between consumers and providers is crucial. Thus, on the one hand, health insurances should gain more market power in the provider market, in which insurance companies pay the services of doctors and hospitals, in order to control costs. One the other hand, however, this increased market power in the provider market needs to be counter-balanced by more competition in the insurance market, in which consumers purchase insurance policies. This requires free choice of consumers among insurance contracts with different prices.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics in its journal Journal of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): 227 (2007)
Issue (Month): 5+6 (December)
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More information through EDIRC
Health care markets; efficiency of health care provision; competition in health care provision;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Production
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Friedrich Breyer & Andreas Haufler, 2000.
"Health Care Reform: Separating Insurance from Income Redistribution,"
Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin
205, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Friedrich Breyer & Andreas Haufler, 2000. "Health Care Reform: Separating Insurance from Income Redistribution," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 445-461, August.
- Breyer, Friedrich & Haufler, Andreas, 1999. "Health care reform: Separating insurance from income redistribution," Discussion Papers, Series 1 296, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
- Breyer, Friedrich & Haufler, Andreas, 2000. "Health Care Reform: Separating Insurance from Income Redistribution," Munich Reprints in Economics 20114, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Ansgar Wübker & Dirk Sauerland & Achim Wübker, 2010. "Beeinflussen bessere Qualitätsinformationen die Krankenhauswahl in Deutschland?," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 230(4), pages 467-490, August.
- Juergen Zerth & Stefanie Daum, 2012. "Budgetbereinigung zwischen Kollektiv- und Selektivvertrag: oekonomische Aspekte aus wettbewerblicher Sicht," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 232(4), pages 460-481, July.
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