Power, Outcomes and Preferences
AbstractThere is an ongoing discussion about the relationship of power and preferences: Is power reflected in what the agents can do and what they want to do, or, alternatively, are preferences and power two separate dimensions of determining the outcome of decisionmaking? In the latter case decisionmaking is troubled with all kinds of paradoxes which do not allow to derive welldefined outcomes which can relate preferences to resources (votes), decision rules, and power - if we do not subscribe to the rather rigorous assumption of single-peaked preferences on a one-dimensional preference space. This paper raises the question whether theses paradoxes do not undermine a power concept which combines preferences and collective decision rules, described by games, with resulting outcomes. A discussion of the Public Good Index with respect to decision rules concludes the paper.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics in its journal Journal of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): 225 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Power measures; preferences; collective decisionmaking; social choice;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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