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Stripped-Down Poker: A Classroom Game with Signaling and Bluffing

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Author Info
David H. Reiley () (University of Arizona)
Michael B. Urbancic
Mark Walker (University of Arizona)
Abstract

The authors present a simplified, "stripped-down" version of poker as an instructional classroom game. Although Stripped-Down Poker is extremely simple, it nevertheless provides an excellent illustration of a number of topics: signaling, bluffing, mixed strategies, the value of information, and Bayes's Rule. The authors begin with a description of Stripped-Down Poker: how to play it, what makes it an interesting classroom game, and how to teach its solution to students. They describe how signaling, bluffing, and so forth emerge naturally as important features of the game and then discuss possible applications of this game-theoretic model to real-world interactions, such as litigation, tax evasion, and domestic or international diplomacy. They also suggest modifications of the game either for use in class or as student exercises. For reference, they conclude with a brief history of game-theoretic treatments of poker.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Helen Dwight Reid Foundation in its journal The Journal of Economic Education.

Volume (Year): 39 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 323-341
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Handle: RePEc:jee:journl:v:39:y:2008:i:4:p:323-341

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Related research
Keywords: classroom experiment; game theory; signaling;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
A22 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Undergraduate
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Rapoport, Amnon & Erev, Ido & Abraham, Elizabeth V. & Olson, David E., 1997. "Randomization and Adaptive Learning in a Simplified Poker Game," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 31-49, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.


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