Endogenous Equilibrium Growth With Recursive Preferences And Increasing Returns
AbstractThis paper studies the short-run and long-run behavior of a competitive economy in which both the discount factor and technological change are endogenously determined. In particular, the effect of saving behavior on persistent economic growth is considered. The paper provides the sufficient condition on the rate of impatience and the concavity of private technology for uniqueness and local stability of the steady state in the competitive economy. The condition implies determinacy of transitional equilibrium paths. However, the paper also shows that the presence of externalities and adjustment cost of investment can lead to indeterminacy of steady state equilibra.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics in its journal Journal Of Economic Development.
Volume (Year): 33 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Recursive Preference; Increasing Returns; Indeterminacy; Local Stability;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - General
- O41 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
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