The Lobbying Game for Recruitment in Asymmetric Information
AbstractBecause the interests of the manager and the organization are not necessarily coincident, the principal-agent problem arises in the process of recruitment. The standard of employment and the motive in the manager's mind may influence the result of recruitment. The present paper analyzes a game in which the recruit may lobby the manager. We discuss the equilibrium when the manager has a prejudice against some applicant or has a consideration about his own future promotion prospects.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan in its journal Journal of Economics and Management.
Volume (Year): 4 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
lobby; sequential equilibrium;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
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