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The Lobbying Game for Recruitment in Asymmetric Information

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  • Jue-Shyan Wang

    (Department of Public Finance, National Chengchi University, Taiwan)

  • Hsiao-Yin Hung

    (Department of Public Finance, National Chengchi University, Taiwan)

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    Abstract

    Because the interests of the manager and the organization are not necessarily coincident, the principal-agent problem arises in the process of recruitment. The standard of employment and the motive in the manager's mind may influence the result of recruitment. The present paper analyzes a game in which the recruit may lobby the manager. We discuss the equilibrium when the manager has a prejudice against some applicant or has a consideration about his own future promotion prospects.

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    File URL: http://www.jem.org.tw/content/pdf/Vol.4No.2/01.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan in its journal Journal of Economics and Management.

    Volume (Year): 4 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 2 (July)
    Pages: 125-143

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    Handle: RePEc:jec:journl:v:4:y:2008:i:2:p:125-143

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    Related research

    Keywords: lobby; sequential equilibrium;

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