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Emergence and Collapse of Peace with Friend Selection Strategies

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Abstract

A society consisting of agents who can freely choose to attack or not to attack others inevitably evolves into a battling society (a 'war of all against all'). We investigated whether strategies based on C. Schmitt's concept of the political, the distinction of a friend and an enemy, lead to the emergence and collapse of social order. Especially, we propose 'friend selection strategies' (FSSs), one of which we called the 'us-TFT' (tit for tat) strategy, which requires an agent to regard one who did not attack him or his 'friends' as a 'friend'. We carried out evolutionary simulations on an artificial society consisting of FSS agents. As a result, we found that the us-TFT results in a peaceful society with the emergence of an us-TFT community. In addition, we found that the collapse of a peaceful society is triggered by another FSS strategy called a 'coward'.

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  • Yutaka NAKAI & Masayoshi Muto, 2008. "Emergence and Collapse of Peace with Friend Selection Strategies," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 11(3), pages 1-6.
    • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2007-96-2
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    Cited by:

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    3. Wen Zhou & Nikita Koptyug & Shutao Ye & Yifan Jia & Xiaolong Lu, 2016. "An Extended N-Player Network Game and Simulation of Four Investment Strategies on a Complex Innovation Network," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(1), pages 1-18, January.
    4. Yutaka Nakai, 2014. "In-group favoritism due to friend selection strategies based on fixed tag and within-group reputation," Rationality and Society, , vol. 26(3), pages 320-354, August.

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