The Integration of Defectors in a Cooperative Setting
AbstractThis paper describes a study of the robustness of cooperative conventions. We observe the effect of the invasion of non-cooperating subjects into a community adopting a cooperative convention. The convention is described by an indefinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma game. We check the effects on the robustness of the cooperating convention of two characteristics of the game, namely the size of the prisonner-dilemma groups and the "intelligence" of the players. The relevance for real-world problems is considered. We find that the "intelligence" of the players plays a crucial role in the way players learn to cooperate. The simulation program is written in SWARM (Java version).
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation in its journal Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation.
Volume (Year): 5 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Cooperation; Conventions; Prisoner's Dilemma; Social Simulation; SWARM;
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