Advanced Search

An extortionary guerrilla movement

Contents:

Author Info

  • Norman Offstein

    (J. W. Lock Co., Covina, California, USA)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper models an extortionary relationship between a pipeline operator and a guerrilla movement. Payment and attack decisions are modeled as an infinite-horizon Markov decision process, where each period the oil company chooses to pay or not pay an extortion demand and the movement decides to attack or not. Decisions depend on the level of single-period payoff and discounted expected future payoffs. We estimate the model with pipeline attack data and compare parameters when the discount factor is changed. We reject a zero discount factor hypothesis, demonstrating that the movement's observed attack pattern is compatible with extortionary behavior. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/jae.962
    File Function: Link to full text; subscription required
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca:80/jae/2007-v22.6/
    File Function: Supporting data files and programs
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Journal of Applied Econometrics.

    Volume (Year): 22 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 6 ()
    Pages: 995-1011
    Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
    Handle: RePEc:jae:japmet:v:22:y:2007:i:6:p:995-1011

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.interscience.wiley.com/jpages/0883-7252/

    Order Information:
    Email:
    Web: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/jcatalog/subscribe.jsp?issn=0883-7252

    For corrections or technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    1. Ariel Pakes & Michael Ostrovsky & Steve Berry, 2004. "Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Samples)," NBER Working Papers 10506, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Rust, John, 1987. "Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 999-1033, September.
    3. Patrick Bajari & Han Hong, 2006. "Semiparametric Estimation of a Dynamic Game of Incomplete Information," NBER Technical Working Papers 0320, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 2000. "Greed and grievance in civil war," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2355, The World Bank.
    5. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke & Soderbom, Mans, 2001. "On the duration of civil war," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2681, The World Bank.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jae:japmet:v:22:y:2007:i:6:p:995-1011

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.