Optimal Bidding in the Mexican Treasury Securities Primary Auctions: Results of a Structural Econometric Approach
AbstractThis analysis of the Mexican Treasury securities primary auctions suggests that the uniform format yields higher revenues than the discriminatory format. It applies the structural econometric model proposed by Février, Préget, and Visser (2004). This mod
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its journal Cuadernos de Economía-Latin American Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 45 (2008)
Issue (Month): 131 ()
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C52 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Philippe Février & Raphaële Preget & Michael Visser, 2002. "Econometrics of Share Auctions," Working Papers 2002-09, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
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