Noncompete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth
AbstractWe find that the enforcement of noncompete clauses significantly impedes entrepreneurship and employment growth. Based on a panel of metropolitan areas in the United States from 1993 to 2002, our results indicate that, relative to states that enforce noncompete covenants, an increase in the local supply of venture capital in states that restrict the scope of these agreements has significantly stronger positive effects on (i) the number of patents, (ii) the number of firm starts, and (iii) employment. We address potential endogeneity in the supply of venture capital by using endowment returns as an instrumental variable. Our results point to a strong interaction between financial intermediation and the legal regime in promoting entrepreneurship and economic growth. This paper was accepted by Gérard P. Cachon, entrepreneurship and innovation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by INFORMS in its journal Management Science.
Volume (Year): 57 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
venture capital; financial intermediaries; legal institutions; entrepreneurship; employment; innovation; wages;
Other versions of this item:
- Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, 2010. "Non-Compete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth," DRUID Working Papers 10-02, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
- L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
- O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
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- Philip Bond & Andrew F. Newman, 2006.
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Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
WP2006-060, Boston University - Department of Economics.
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- Guido Bünstorf & Christoph Engel & Sven Fischer & Werner Güth, 2013.
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Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2013_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Guido Bünstorf & Christoph Engel & Sven Fischer & Werner Güth, 2013. "Win Shift Lose Stay - An Experimental Test of Non-Compete Clauses," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-038, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Bozkaya, Ant & Kerr, William R., 2013. "Labor regulations and European venture capital," Research Discussion Papers 30/2013, Bank of Finland.
- Matt Marx & Lee Fleming, 2011. "Non-compete Agreements: Barriers to Entry…and Exit?," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 12, pages 39-64 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ann-Kathrine Ejsing & Ulrich Kaiser & Hans Christian Kongsted & Keld Laursen, 2013. " The Role of University Scientist Mobility for Industrial Innovation," Working Papers 336, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW).
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