Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The End of the Robinson-Patman Act? Evidence from Legal Case Data

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ryan Luchs

    ()
    (Palumbo-Donahue School of Business, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15282)

  • Tansev Geylani

    ()
    (Joseph M. Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260)

  • Anthony Dukes

    ()
    (Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089)

  • Kannan Srinivasan

    ()
    (Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213)

Abstract

The Robinson-Patman Act (RP), an antitrust statute aimed at protecting small businesses, limits price setting in distribution channels. To avoid costly penalties under RP, managers take a variety of precautions when pricing to retailers and wholesalers. But how likely is a court to find a defendant guilty of violating the RP? We find that this likelihood has dropped drastically as a result of recent Supreme Court rulings from more than 1 in 3 before 1993 to less than 1 in 20 for the period 2006-2010. The analysis also points to an increased success of the no harm to competition defense, which reflects the view that the courts have raised the hurdle for plaintiffs to establish competitive harm. Finally, our results indicate that smaller plaintiffs over time have fared worse than larger ones, a trend that challenges the notion that RP protects small businesses.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1244
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by INFORMS in its journal Management Science.

Volume (Year): 56 (2010)
Issue (Month): 12 (December)
Pages: 2123-2133

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:56:y:2010:i:12:p:2123-2133

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 7240 Parkway Drive, Suite 300, Hanover, MD 21076 USA
Phone: +1-443-757-3500
Fax: 443-757-3515
Email:
Web page: http://www.informs.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: pricing; channels of distribution; Robinson-Patman Act; case history;

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller, 2014. "Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Quantity Discounts and Private Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(577), pages 776-804, 06.
  2. Müller, Daniel & Herweg, Fabian, 2013. "Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Quantity Discounts and Private Information," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79978, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  3. Anthony Dukes & Tansev Geylani & Yunchuan Liu, 2014. "Dominant retailers’ incentives for product quality in asymmetric distribution channels," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 93-107, March.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:56:y:2010:i:12:p:2123-2133. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mirko Janc).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.