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Warranty Signalling and Reputation

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  • Subramanian Balachander

    (Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907)

Abstract

In this paper, we present a signalling-based explanation for the empirical phenomenon that a longer warranty may be offered by a product with lower quality. Our explanation hinges on differences in consumer knowledge about reliability of established and newer products. In a product market where a new entrant competes with an established product, we show that signalling behavior leads to an outcome where the less reliable product may carry the longer warranty.

Suggested Citation

  • Subramanian Balachander, 2001. "Warranty Signalling and Reputation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(9), pages 1282-1289, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:47:y:2001:i:9:p:1282-1289
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.47.9.1282.9783
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dror Etzion & Aviad Pe'er, 2014. "Mixed signals: A dynamic analysis of warranty provision in the automotive industry, 1960–2008," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(11), pages 1605-1625, November.
    2. Yoo, Seung Ho, 2014. "Product quality and return policy in a supply chain under risk aversion of a supplier," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 146-155.
    3. Niu, Baozhuang & Mu, Zihao & Cao, Bin & Gao, Jie, 2021. "Should multinational firms implement blockchain to provide quality verification?," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    4. Tong Peng & Liu Chunling, 2020. "Designing differential service strategy for two-dimensional warranty based on warranty claim data under consumer-side modularisation," Journal of Risk and Reliability, , vol. 234(3), pages 550-561, June.
    5. Cao, Kaiying & Su, Yunyi & Han, Guoxin & Choi, Tsan-Ming, 2022. "Is it wise to offer rebates for unused extended warranties under trade-in programs in supply chains?," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    6. Liang Guo & Yue Wu, 2016. "Consumer deliberation and quality signaling," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 233-269, September.
    7. Baojun Jiang & Jian Ni & Kannan Srinivasan, 2014. "Signaling Through Pricing by Service Providers with Social Preferences," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(5), pages 641-654, September.
    8. Baojun Jiang & Bicheng Yang, 2019. "Quality and Pricing Decisions in a Market with Consumer Information Sharing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 272-285, January.
    9. Kurata, Hisashi & Nam, Seong-Hyun, 2010. "After-sales service competition in a supply chain: Optimization of customer satisfaction level or profit or both?," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 136-146, September.
    10. Kurt, Didem & Pauwels, Koen & Kurt, Ahmet C. & Srinivasan, Shuba, 2021. "The asymmetric effect of warranty payments on firm value: The moderating role of advertising, R&D, and industry concentration," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 817-837.
    11. Cao, Zixia, 2022. "Brand equity, warranty costs, and firm value," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 1166-1185.
    12. Kirkizoğlu, Zeynep & Karaer, Özgen, 2022. "After-sales service and warranty decisions of a durable goods manufacturer," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    13. Jeffrey D. Shulman & Marcus Cunha & Julian K. Saint Clair, 2015. "Consumer Uncertainty and Purchase Decision Reversals: Theory and Evidence," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(4), pages 590-605, July.
    14. Liu, Shuo & Pei, Harry, 2020. "Monotone equilibria in signaling games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    15. Dang, Van Thac & Nguyen, Ninh & Pervan, Simon, 2020. "Retailer corporate social responsibility and consumer citizenship behavior: The mediating roles of perceived consumer effectiveness and consumer trust," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    16. Lei, Yong & Liu, Qian & Shum, Stephen, 2017. "Warranty pricing with consumer learning," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 263(2), pages 596-610.
    17. Munten, Pauline & Vanhamme, Joëlle, 2023. "To reduce waste, have it repaired! The quality signaling effect of product repairability," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    18. Amr Farahat & Woonghee Tim Huh & Hongmin Li, 2019. "On the Relationship Between Quantity Precommitment and Cournot Games," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(1), pages 109-122, January.
    19. Jianhua Ma & Xingzheng Ai & Wen Yang & Yanchun Pan, 2019. "Decentralization versus coordination in competing supply chains under retailers’ extended warranties," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 275(2), pages 485-510, April.
    20. Ammar Y. Alqahtani & Surendra M. Gupta, 2017. "One-Dimensional Renewable Warranty Management within Sustainable Supply Chain," Resources, MDPI, vol. 6(2), pages 1-26, April.
    21. Dong Li & Nishant Mishra & Serguei Netessine, 2023. "Contracting for Product Support Under Information Asymmetry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4627-4645, August.
    22. Yogesh V. Joshi & Andres Musalem, 2021. "When Consumers Learn, Money Burns: Signaling Quality via Advertising with Observational Learning and Word of Mouth," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(1), pages 168-188, January.
    23. Schmidbauer, Eric & Stock, Axel, 2018. "Quality signaling via strikethrough prices," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 524-532.
    24. Kim, Bowon & Park, Sangsun, 2008. "Optimal pricing, EOL (end of life) warranty, and spare parts manufacturing strategy amid product transition," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 188(3), pages 723-745, August.

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