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Signals and Choices in a Competitive Interaction: The Role of Moves and Messages

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  • Marian Chapman Moore

    (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27706)

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    Abstract

    This study examines the effect of signals from a competitor on the decisions of managers in a situation of strategic interdependence. The context is a multi-period pricing simulation and the payoffs are structured in accordance with a Prisoner's Dilemma. The signals consist of messages from the competitor and observations of the pricing decisions made by the competitor. The managers' responses to particular types of signals and particular combinations of moves and messages change over the course of the simulation. Suggestions for future research on competitive signaling are offered.

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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.4.483
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by INFORMS in its journal Management Science.

    Volume (Year): 38 (1992)
    Issue (Month): 4 (April)
    Pages: 483-500

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    Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:38:y:1992:i:4:p:483-500

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    Related research

    Keywords: marketing; competitive strategy; signalling; games: noncooperative;

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    Cited by:
    1. Pruyn, Ad & Riezebos, Rik, 2001. "Effects of the awareness of social dilemmas on advertising budget-setting: A scenario study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 43-60, February.
    2. Baumard, Philippe & Ibert, Jérôme, 1998. "The Oligopolist's Discordance Made Acceptable? Enacting Socially-Embedded Knowledge to Act it Out in One's Favor," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4638, Paris Dauphine University.
    3. Kohli, Chiranjeev, 1999. "Signaling New Product Introductions: A Framework Explaining the Timing of Preannouncements," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 45-56, September.
    4. Rebecca Guidice & G. Alder & Steven Phelan, 2009. "Competitive Bluffing: An Examination of a Common Practice and its Relationship with Performance," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 87(4), pages 535-553, July.

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