The Structure of Equilibria in Market Share Attraction Models
AbstractA market share attraction model of competitive effort allocation by two firms is formulated as a constant sum, two-person game. The dependence of optimal competitive effort allocations on factors such as gross profit margins, relative effectiveness of effort, and attraction elasticity of effort is studied. Two versions of the model are developed. In the first version, effort budgets of both competitors are exogenously fixed. In the second, the competitors each choose both budget levels and allocations. In each version of the model, an important function of the parameters, called the competitive advantage ratio, indicates when it is optimal to either increase or decrease effort allocated in a market in response to changes in various measures of effectiveness. Implications of differences in the cost associated with each competitor's budget on equilibrium allocations are derived.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by INFORMS in its journal Management Science.
Volume (Year): 33 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
market share attraction game; Nash equilibrium; sensitivity analysis;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Mesak, Hani I., 1999. "On the generalizability of advertising pulsation monopoly results to an oligopoly," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 429-449, September.
- Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, 2004.
"Contests with Size Effects,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1346, CESifo Group Munich.
- Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, 2005. "Contests with Size Effects," Ifo Working Paper Series Ifo Working Paper No. 2, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
- Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, . "Contests with Size Effects," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- John Duffy & Alexander Matros, 2013. "Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 509, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2013.
- Alex Robson, 2005. "Multi-Item Contests," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2005-446, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mirko Janc).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.