IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v19y1972i3p266-271.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Solution of a Satisficing Model for Random Payoff Games

Author

Listed:
  • R. G. Cassidy

    (Carnegie-Mellon University)

  • C. A. Field

    (Dalhousie University)

  • M. J. L. Kirby

    (Dalhousie University)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a "satisficing" criterion to solve two-person zero-sum games with random payoffs. In particular, a player wants to maximize the payoff level he can achieve with a specified confidence. The problem reduces to solving a nonconvex mathematical programming problem. The main result shows that solving this problem is equivalent to finding the root of an equation whose values are determined by solving a linear problem. This linear problem results from maximizing the confidence with fixed payoff level.

Suggested Citation

  • R. G. Cassidy & C. A. Field & M. J. L. Kirby, 1972. "Solution of a Satisficing Model for Random Payoff Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(3), pages 266-271, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:19:y:1972:i:3:p:266-271
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.19.3.266
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.19.3.266
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/mnsc.19.3.266?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Longsheng Sun & Mark H. Karwan & Changhyun Kwon, 2018. "Generalized Bounded Rationality and Robust Multicommodity Network Design," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 66(1), pages 42-57, 1-2.
    2. Rossana Riccardi & Giorgia Oggioni & Elisabetta Allevi & Abdel Lisser, 2023. "Complementarity formulation of games with random payoffs," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 1-32, December.
    3. Singh, Vikas Vikram & Lisser, Abdel & Arora, Monika, 2021. "An equivalent mathematical program for games with random constraints," Statistics & Probability Letters, Elsevier, vol. 174(C).
    4. Singh, Vikas Vikram & Lisser, Abdel, 2019. "A second-order cone programming formulation for two player zero-sum games with chance constraints," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 275(3), pages 839-845.
    5. Chunsheng Cui & Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan, 2018. "Credibilistic Loss Aversion Nash Equilibrium for Bimatrix Games with Triangular Fuzzy Payoffs," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2018, pages 1-16, December.
    6. Cheng, Jianqiang & Leung, Janny & Lisser, Abdel, 2016. "Random-payoff two-person zero-sum game with joint chance constraints," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 252(1), pages 213-219.
    7. Xiangfeng Yang & Jinwu Gao, 2017. "Bayesian equilibria for uncertain bimatrix game with asymmetric information," Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 515-525, March.
    8. James J. Buckley, 1983. "Decision Making Under Risk: A Comparison of Bayesian and Fuzzy Set Methods," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 3(3), pages 157-168, September.
    9. Shen Peng & Navnit Yadav & Abdel Lisser & Vikas Vikram Singh, 2021. "Chance-constrained games with mixture distributions," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 94(1), pages 71-97, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:19:y:1972:i:3:p:266-271. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.