Potential monopsony in labor markets
AbstractEmpirical findings of recent labor market research are used in this article in the construction of theoretical models of the wage and employment behavior of the firm in an unorganized labor market. Four cases are discussed: the firm with labor requirements fixed over a range of wage rates; a firm with labor needs varying with wage levels; employment discrimination between groups of workers with different characteristics; and "promotion from within." (Author's abstract courtesy EBSCO.)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School in its journal ILR Review.
Volume (Year): 9 (1956)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Postal: 381 Ives East, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
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- Douglas Webber, 2011.
"Firm Market Power and the Earnings Distribution,"
11-41, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
- Webber, Douglas A., 2013. "Firm-Level Monopsony and the Gender Pay Gap," IZA Discussion Papers 7343, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Michaelides, Marios, 2010. "Labour market oligopsonistic competition: The effect of worker immobility on wages," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 230-239, January.
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