Principals as Agents? Investigating Accountability in the Compensation and Performance of School Principals
AbstractAlthough school accountability incentives and standards, such as district-mandated goals and state sanctions for poor performance, are increasingly common, few studies have investigated their effectiveness. The author of this paper seeks evidence on whether such policies affect public secondary principal pay and school performance. An analysis of cross-sectional variation in data from the 1999–2000 Schools and Staffing Survey indicates that accountability policies coincided with lower college matriculation rates and lower principal pay, particularly for the best principals. On the other hand, the policies were associated with higher student retention rates at the worst schools. Though principals at those schools may not have been directly rewarded through accountability policies, these principals appear to have acted as agents for students in danger of dropping out.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School in its journal ILR Review.
Volume (Year): 61 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Postal: 381 Ives East, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
Other versions of this item:
- Billger, Sherrilyn M., 2007. "Principals as Agents? Investigating Accountability in the Compensation and Performance of School Principals," IZA Discussion Papers 2662, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- J48 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Particular Labor Markets; Public Policy
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
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